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National	polarization	means	that	it	no	longer	pays	for
local	candidates	to	appeal	to	all	voters
In	theory,	political	candidates	who	have	the	widest	appeal	are	the	most	likely	to	win	elections.	But
recent	decades	have	shown	us	that	this	is	decidedly	not	the	case:	polarization	now	means	that	quite
extreme	candidates	win	elections	in	many	districts.	Mattias	Polborn	uses	a	new	model	of	legislative
elections	and	finds	that	extreme	candidates	are	likely	to	prevail	if	the	positions	of	national	politicians
and	parties	are	important	factors	for	voters.
In	his	famous	book	“The	Wealth	of	Nations,”	Adam	Smith	suggested	that	competition	between	profit-motivated
agents	brings	about	good,	efficient,	outcomes	for	the	agents	that	populate	the	economy.	“It	is	not	from	the
benevolence	of	the	butcher	or	the	baker	that	we	expect	our	dinner,	but	from	their	regard	to	their	own	self-interest.”
Does	a	similar	result	obtain	for	political	competition?	More	specifically,	does	competitive	pressure	—	i.e.,	the	need	to
win	the	election	against	an	opposing	candidate	—	force	candidates	to	propose	good	policies,	or	do	voters	rather
have	to	rely	on	the	benevolence	of	political	candidates	(in	which	case	we	really	should	not	hold	our	breath)?
The	most	fundamental	result	in	the	theoretical	analysis	of	elections	argues	that	competition	indeed	forces
moderation.	The	“median	voter	theorem”	states	that,	in	elections	with	two	candidates,	both	have	to	choose	positions
that	appeal	to	the	voter	who	represents	the	middle	point	of	all	voters’	political	views.	Then,	after	both	candidates
adopt	such	a	compromise	position,	all	voters	are	indifferent	between	them,	and	both	candidates	have	the	same
chance	of	winning.
Yet,	in	reality	something	appears	to	have	gone	wrong	with	these	predictions:	For	the	last	40	years,	polarization
between	Republicans	and	Democrats	in	US	Congress	has	increased	dramatically,	and	in	a	large	majority	of	districts,
which	party	will	represent	the	district	is	rarely	in	doubt.
A	new	model	for	investigating	political	competition
Our	new	model	analyzes	the	logic	of	political	competition	in	legislative	elections,	such	as	those	for	Congress	or	for
state	legislatures.	We	stipulate	that	voters	generally	decide	who	to	vote	for	not	just	based	on	their	local	candidates’
positions,	but	also	on	the	positions	of	national	politicians	and	parties,	even	though	they	are	not	explicitly	on	their
ballot.
This	link	between	local	candidates	and	national	parties	reduces	or	even	eliminates	the	competitive	pressure	to
nominate	moderate	candidates	at	the	district	level.	Republicans	can	win	in	moderately	conservative	districts	and
Democrats	in	moderately	liberal	ones,	even	if	they	nominate	candidates	that	are	more	extreme	than	most	voters	in
these	districts	would	prefer.
To	see	why,	let’s	think	about	a	district	in	which	the	median	voter	is	somewhat	conservative.	The	median	voter
theorem	would	call	for	such	a	district	to	elect	a	somewhat	conservative	representative,	who,	however,	could	be	either
a	Republican	or	a	Democrat.	But	what	if	voters	care	about	both	the	local	candidates’	own	positions,	and	the	positions
of	their	respective	national	parties?
The	Republican	primary	voter	could	easily	guarantee	a	victory	for	his	party	by	nominating	a	local	candidate	who
perfectly	represents	the	district	median	voter’s	ideal	position	because	the	median	voter	then	would	like	the
Republican	local	candidate	at	least	as	much	as	the	Democratic	local	candidate,	and	he	would	strictly	prefer	the
national	Republican	position	over	the	national	Democratic	position.
However,	more	importantly,	the	Republican	primary	voters	do	not	need	to	nominate	such	a	moderate	compromise
candidate:	They	can	nominate	a	candidate,	let’s	call	him	Mr.	Wingnut,	who	is	more	conservative	than	the
moderately-conservative	district	median	voter.
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To	show	that	Mr.	Wingnut	could	win	against	the	most	competitive	possible	candidate	that	the	Democrats	can	field
(Ms.	Bluedog,	a	somewhat	conservative	Democratic	candidate	espousing	exactly	the	median	voter’s	preferred
positions),	consider	the	following	argument:	“Yes,	Ms.	Bluedog	is	a	reasonable	person.	But,	as	a	Democrat,	she	will
also	vote	to	make	Nancy	Pelosi	Speaker	of	the	House,	and	you	know	what	would	happen	then.”	If	the	latter	is
sufficiently	important	to	the	district	median	voter,	Mr.	Wingnut	can	be	somewhat,	possibly	substantially,	more
conservative	than	the	median	voter	would	like	and	yet	win	his	vote.
In	districts	that	are	somewhat	conservative,	how	conservative	is	the	Republican	nominee	is	determined	by	how
conservative	he	can	be	and	still	win	the	general	election.	In	even	more	conservative	districts,	electoral	competition
may	completely	lose	its	disciplining	force:	Republican	primary	voters	will	be	able	to	nominate	their	ideal	candidate
(i.e.,	they	don’t	have	to	compromise	at	all)	and	will	still	be	able	to	win,	even	if	that	candidate	is	substantially	more
conservative	than	the	district	median	voter.
National	polarization	matters	locally
National	polarization	–	the	bigger	differences	between	the	two	parties’	national	positions	—	allows	more	and	more
extreme	candidates	to	win	in	each	district.	This	is	the	case	because	larger	differences	between	parties	mean	that	the
median	voter	in	almost	every	district	has	a	more	pronounced	preference	for	one	of	the	two	national	parties,	and	that
party’s	local	supporters	can	exploit	this	preference	by	nominating	a	more	extreme	candidate	who	still	wins.	With
more	liberal	Democrats	and	more	conservative	Republicans	winning	in	every	district,	the	national	positions	will	move
farther	apart,	generating	a	vicious	cycle	of	polarization.
How	did	national	polarization	intensify?	Many	political	practitioners	suspect	that	gerrymandering	is	a	major	culprit.	In
the	attempt	to	increase	the	number	of	Congressional	districts	that	their	own	party	can	win,	state	legislative	majority
parties	generally	try	to	create	a	few	districts	in	which	they	pack	as	many	supporters	of	the	opposing	party	as
possible,	and	a	larger	number	of	districts	in	which	their	own	party	has	a	substantial,	though	not	overwhelming
advantage.
The	effect	of	the	super-packed	districts	is	not	just	that	they	are	vote	sinks	for	the	opposing	party.	These	districts	also
elect	fairly	extreme	representatives	that	then	participate	in	defining	their	party’s	position	in	Congress.	This,	in	turn,
serves	as	a	useful	strawman	to	convince	voters	in	moderately-leaning	districts	not	to	vote	for	a	moderate	opposition
candidate	—	a	variation	of	the	“Look,	she	is	with	Nancy	Pelosi”	argument	detailed	above.
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We	find	substantial	empirical	support	for	the	predictions	of	our	model.	First,	the	positions	of	House	representatives
from	relatively	moderate	districts	change	significantly	with	the	precise	ideological	position	of	their	district	—	among
moderate	districts,	more	conservative	districts	do	have	more	conservative	representatives.	This	is	what	the	model
predicts	for	relatively	moderate	districts	in	which	primary	voters	of	the	advantaged	party	have	to	worry	whether	their
candidate	can	win	in	the	general	election.
But	in	more	liberal	or	conservative	districts,	an	increase	in	the	district’s	liberal	or	conservative	tilt	does	not	(or	much
less)	translate	into	a	more	liberal	or	conservative	representative,	respectively.	This	indicates	that,	in	these	districts,
primary	voters	do	not	feel	compelled	to	nominate	moderate	candidates	in	order	to	compete	in	the	general	election,
but	rather	feel	that,	whoever	they	nominate	will	win	and	therefore	choose	their	ideal	candidate.
Second,	voters	appear	to	behave	differently	in	legislative	and	executive	elections,	in	a	way	that	makes	the	former
less	competitive	than	the	latter.	In	US	Senate	and	gubernatorial	elections	from	1974	to	2012,	a	one-percentage	point
shift	in	a	state’s	presidential	vote	—	a	standard	measure	for	the	state’s	ideological	leanings	—	has	an	effect	that	is
almost	twice	as	large	on	the	vote	outcome	in	a	Senate	election	as	in	a	gubernatorial	election.
This	makes	sense	in	our	theoretical	framework:	When	voting	for	a	Senate	candidate,	voters	are	much	more	likely	to
weigh	party	affiliation	because	a	Senator	is	not	able	to	implement	policy	just	on	his	or	her	own.	In	contrast,
Governors	often	cultivate	an	air	of	independence	from	their	own	party,	and	there	are	many	examples	of	moderate
candidates	elected	in	states	that	are	ideologically-unfriendly	territory	for	their	party.
This	article	is	based	on	the	paper	“Political	Competition	in	Legislative	Elections”	in	American	Political	Science
Review.
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